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Introduction
The transformation from inter-state to intra-
state conflict from the latter part of the 20th 
Century in West Africa brought a number of 
its economies to near collapse. As a result, the 
sub-region’s security environment has often 
been viewed as one that continues to be pre-
carious and unstable. Although conflicts are 
not always violent, those that have plagued 
West Africa at community, state and regional 
levels have been characterized by violence 
(Afisi 2009: 59–66). For decades, countries 
such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire 
and Guinea-Bissau were crippled by conflicts 
and civil strife in which violence and inces-
sant killings were prevalent (Afolabi 2009: 
24). While violent conflicts are declining in 
the sub-region, recent insurgencies in the 
Sahel region affecting the West African coun-
tries of Mali, Niger and Mauritania sends 
alarming signals of the possible re-surfacing 
of internal and regional violent conflicts. 
More critical to add is the low intensity con-
flicts surging within notably stable countries 
such as the Casamance conflict in Senegal, 
the intermittent Dagbon chieftaincy crisis in 
Ghana and the Niger Delta conflict in Nige-
ria to name a few (Olonisakin 2011: 11–26). 
These conflicts have resulted in the ‘destruc-
tion of lives and property, the internal dis-
placement of people, a region-wide refugee 
crisis, poverty and disease, the proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons, human 
and drug trafficking, illegal exploitation 
of natural resources and banditry’ (Afolabi 
2009: 25). 
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The advent of intra-state conflicts or ‘new wars’ in West Africa has brought many of its 
economies to the brink of collapse, creating humanitarian casualties and concerns. For 
decades, countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea- Bissau were 
crippled by conflicts and civil strife in which violence and incessant killings were prevalent. 
While violent conflicts are declining in the sub-region, recent insurgencies in the Sahel 
region affecting the West African countries of Mali, Niger and Mauritania and low intensity 
conflicts surging within notably stable countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal sends 
alarming signals of the possible re-surfacing of internal and regional violent conflicts. These 
conflicts are often hinged on several factors including poverty, human rights violations, bad 
governance and corruption, ethnic marginalization and small arms proliferation. Although 
many actors including the ECOWAS, civil society and international community have been 
making efforts, conflicts continue to persist in the sub-region and their resolution is often 
protracted. This paper posits that the poor understanding of the fundamental causes of 
West Africa’s violent conflicts and civil strife would likely cause the sub-region to continue 
experiencing and suffering the brunt of these violent wars.
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Ending violent conflicts in West Africa 
remains one of the main challenges of the 
sub- region. This is possibly attributed to 
the sudden shift from inter-state to intra-
state conflicts that characterized most part 
of the late 1980s through to the 21st century 
posing a new challenge of intra-state peace 
consolidation and conflict prevention. Par-
ticular for a number of actors including the 
sub-regional bloc, the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS) which 
was set up to build economic integration 
(Jaye et al 2011: 1–7). Nevertheless, over 
the years, states, the ECOWAS, Civil Society 
groups and the International Community 
have taken measures to resolve and end vio-
lent conflicts in the sub-region. Examples 
can be cited of ECOWAS’ timely response to 
the violent civil wars that erupted in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone in 1989 and 1991 respec-
tively through the deployment of the ECO-
WAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Jaye et 
al 2011: 1–7). Despite these efforts which 
have achieved some appreciable success, 
the cradle of peace and stability in the sub-
region remains brittle and the possibility of 
a resurgence of seemingly ended conflicts is 
high.1 Buttressing the latter is the example 
of West Africa’s first Republic state, Libe-
ria, where the country relapsed into a sec-
ond civil war in 1999 after ECOWAS Cease 
fire intervention ended the first civil war in 
1996.2 In the period between 2010 and 2011, 
Côte d’Ivoire almost plunged back into civil 
war after its disputed November 2010 elec-
tion led to violent confrontations between 
loyalists of then President Laurent Gbagbo 
and opposition Alassane Ouattara claiming 
the lives of over 3000 Ivoirians and displac-
ing many (BBC News Africa 2011). These few 
examples raise questions on the capacity and 
mechanisms used to resolve conflicts in West 
Africa and the effectiveness of these mecha-
nisms to ensure sustainable peace in the sub-
region. The paper posits that failure to iden-
tify and thoroughly address the fundamental 
causes of West Africa’s violent conflicts and 
civil strife would likely cause the sub-region 
to continue experiencing and suffering the 
brunt of these violent wars. Against this 
background, the author attempts to support 
discourses on violent conflicts and civil strife 
in West Africa by first giving an overview of 
violent conflicts and civil strife in the sub-
region; identifying and expatiating on the 
causes of these conflicts; elaborate on exist-
ing initiatives; identifying challenges imped-
ing efforts towards ending conflicts in the 
sub-region; and finally concluding with pros-
pects for future conflict resolution. 
Conceptualizing Conflicts and War 
Ending in West Africa
The conceptualization of conflicts and war 
ending is dynamic and constantly evolving 
particularly in the post-cold war era. With 
the paradigmatic shift from inter-state to 
intra-state conflicts, many literatures have 
different definitions and concepts of conflict 
and its resolution. To Bernard Mayer (2000) 
conflicts can be explained through a three-
dimensional lens. That is ‘conflict as per-
ception,’ ‘conflict as feeling’ and ‘conflict as 
action.’ As a perception, Mayer identifies that 
conflict is often the conviction that ‘one’s own 
needs, interests, wants, or values are incom-
patible with someone else’s’ (Mayer 2000). As 
a feeling, conflict can be expressed through 
several emotions including ‘fear, anger, bit-
terness, sadness, hopelessness’ or the combi-
nation of these (Mayer 2000). Finally, Mayer 
highlights that conflict involves actions 
which may be ‘violent or destructive’ (Mayer 
2000). To the ECOWAS, conflict is defined 
as ‘contradictions inherent in power rela-
tions and which manifest themselves in 
individual and group interactions with one 
another and with nature in the pursuit of 
limited resources or opportunities’ (ECPF 
2008). For the purposes of this article, con-
flict could be seen as a violent expression of 
disagreements and frustration often arising 
from unmet needs and aspirations. As indi-
cated earlier, while conflicts are not always 
violent, the ones that have affected West 
Africa have been characterized by violence 
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and brutality. While the conceptualization of 
low intensity conflicts (LIC) remains unclear, 
this article refers to LIC as prolonged, sub-
tle yet staid altercations between different 
groups often with socio-economic, political 
and military intentions. LIC has the potential 
of erupting into full-blown conflict if unre-
solved.
Invariably, conflicts in West Africa have 
been notably fuelled by multiple interrelated 
causal factors including poverty, human 
rights violations, bad governance and cor-
ruption, ethnic marginalization and small 
arms proliferation (Fithen 1999; Voz di Paz 
and Interpeace 2010; Vinck et al 2011; Keili 
2008). While the above causes persist, some 
of the conflicts that have occurred in the sub-
region have been linked to certain triggers 
which often ignite the uprisings. According 
to ECOWAS, as defined in its Conflict Preven-
tion Framework 2008, these triggers are asso-
ciated with sudden happenings that arouse 
tensions often leading to violent conflicts 
(ECPF 2008). For example, the 2012 coup 
d’état in Mali was reportedly triggered by the 
lack of support from the Traoré regime to the 
Malian army to handle the Tuareg rebellion 
in January 2012 which led to the death of 
several national soldiers (Chew 2012). 
Ending war or conflicts especially in West 
Africa has been quite a challenge due to its 
complex multi-causal factors, multiple actors 
and the nature of the conflict; often con-
tributing to prolonging the conflict. James 
Fearon (2002), in his article ‘Why do some 
civil wars last so much longer than others?,’ 
identified that although coup-related civil 
wars are often brief, ‘sons of the soil’(often 
led by insurgent and rebel groups) tend to 
be longer and difficult to resolve because 
they often hinged on ethnic fragmentation 
and undemocratic leadership. Furthermore, 
Fearon explained that the latter tends to be 
protracted because the belligerent groups 
expect to gain military supremacy or use 
violence to acquire favourable agreements 
(Fearon 2002). Evidently, the nature of civil 
wars in West Africa has taken the form of 
either coups d’état or insurgency. While the 
former have often been short-lived (eg. Mali 
and Guinea-Bissau coups in 2012), the latter 
however have been protracted (eg. Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Northern Mali).
Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in 
West Africa
West Africa has been grappling with violent 
conflicts and civil strife for decades, how-
ever, the periods between the 1980s and the 
1990s leading to the new millennium pre-
sented more violent and protracted conflicts 
which destabilized many of its economies 
(Aning and Bah 2009; UNSC Report 2011). 
Notable countries that plunged into violent 
conflict during that period include Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire 
(Aning and Bah 2009). 
Past conflicts
Liberia plunged into its first violent civil war in 
December 1989 with the invasion of Charles 
Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL).3 Taylor’s rebellion, which sought to 
overthrow the autocratic and repressive rule 
of then President Samuel Doe, not only suc-
ceeded with his ascension to power in the 
1997 elections, but also resulted in the out-
break of a violent seven-year civil war (Vinck 
et al 2011). In 1996, with the support of the 
ECOMOG, violence was abated leading to a 
ceasefire. Nevertheless, this seeming peace 
was short-lived as longstanding and simmer-
ing ethnic tensions, corruption, subjugation 
and abject poverty of the people thrust the 
country back into a second civil war in 1999; 
two years after Taylor was elected into office 
as president (Kieh and Klay 2009). During 
the ensuing five-year civil war, the coun-
try was besieged by violent confrontations 
between Taylor’s NPFL, the Liberians United 
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) 
and the Movement for Democracy in Libe-
ria (MODEL) until the signing of a Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement in 2003 led to the 
attainment of appreciable peace and stability 
in Liberia (Vinck et al 2011). By the end of the 
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second civil war, there were reported high 
cases of rape and torture, high death rates, 
destruction of basic infrastructure and ser-
vices, malnutrition and about 21,000 child 
soldiers to disarm and demobilize (Vinck et 
al 2011). The 2009 report of the Liberian 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
indicated that 250,000 people were killed 
in the almost 14-year conflict and one mil-
lion displaced (LTRC 2009). Subsequently, in 
2010, the country reportedly ranked 162 of 
169 countries in the Human Development 
Index, making it one of the poorest countries 
in the world (Vinck et al 2011).
Two years after the outbreak of civil war in 
Liberia, violent civil conflict also erupted in 
neighbouring Sierra Leone in 1991 hinged 
on a coup led by Foday Sankoh’s Revolution-
ary United Front (RUF) rebel group against 
President Momoh’s regime (Richards 2003). 
Clashes between the Ghaddafi and Taylor 
supported RUF and the incumbent resulted 
in over a decade long violent conflict which 
was officially declared over in February 2002. 
The conflict, arising from corruption, bad 
governance, social injustice, and breakdown 
of democratic institutions resulted in the 
killing of 50,000 people, and the destruc-
tion of infrastructure as well as other perti-
nent social services (Kargbo 2002). Similarly, 
Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire experienced 
violent civil conflicts in 1998 and 2002 
respectively. Like other West African states, 
Guinea-Bissau’s history is characterized with 
periodic conflicts however; the ‘7th June 
War’ in 1998 pushed the former Portuguese 
colony into a violent civil strife (Voz di Paz 
and Interpeace 2010). The 11-month conflict 
which ended on 7 May 1999, led by Brigadier 
Ansumane Mane, was supposedly caused by 
weapon trafficking in neighboring Senegal 
for the Casamance independence movement, 
corruption and human rights abuse. Like all 
violent conflicts, casualties were recorded 
as it claimed the lives of thousands and 
entrenched poverty in the country (Voz di 
Paz and Interpeace 2010). Despite enjoying 
turbulent peace over the past ten years after 
the 1998 conflict, characterized by periodic 
political crisis, the coup d’état in April 2012 
which led to the arrest of Prime Minister Car-
los Gomes Júnior threatened the security and 
already fragile peace of this small West Afri-
can state (Crisis Group 2012). 
Furthermore, the civil conflict that plagued 
Côte d’Ivoire, the one-time economic power 
house and the beacon of stability in West 
Africa cannot be overlooked. Deeply rooted 
in ethnic-religious divisions and identity 
aggravated by politics of exclusion, the coun-
try erupted into full-fledged civil strife in Sep-
tember 2002 (Ogwang 2011).4 Following the 
explosion of the civil strife into a violent con-
flict, several peace initiatives were adopted 
but failed to resolve the conflict in Côte 
d’Ivoire until the successful signing of the 
Ouagadougou peace accord in 2007 restored 
peace and stability in the country (Ogwang 
2011: 6). With three years of relative peace 
in the country, Ivoirians were ready to take 
to the polls in November 2010, a critical elec-
tion which was anticipated to consolidate 
the peace the country had enjoyed and unify 
its stratified population. Much to their cha-
grin, the country nearly relapsed back into 
a violent civil war after the disputed elec-
tions led to a violent confrontation between 
loyalists of incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and 
main opposition Alassane Ouattara (Ogwang 
2011). The following five-month battle led to 
the death of over 3000 people and the dis-
placement of many.5
Present and emerging conflicts
Generally, even though there is a decline in 
large scale violent conflict and civil strife, 
pockets of simmering tensions, insurgency 
and the re-emergence of coups d’état contin-
ues to trouble the sub-region. For example 
the recent coups d’état in Guinea-Bissau and 
Mali; insurgency in the Sahel region affect-
ing West African countries of Mali, Niger 
and Mauritania, as well as low-scale con-
flicts in notably stable countries like Ghana, 
Senegal and Nigeria further makes the sub-
region capricious and prone to more violent 
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conflicts (Gilmour 2012; Olonisakin 2011). 
Since gaining independence in 1960 from 
the French, Mali, Africa’s third largest gold 
producer suffered several coups and ethnic 
tensions until attaining multi party democ-
racy in 1992 with the election of President 
Alpha Konare (BBC News Africa 2012a). Nev-
ertheless, the democracy and relative stabil-
ity in the country was not to last, as the re-
surfacing of violent conflict in the north by 
the National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad (MNLA) Tuareg rebels and Al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) in 2007 and 
the coup d’état in 2012 resulted in killings, 
mass forced displacement of civilians desta-
bilizing Mali’s political tranquillity (Gilmour 
2012; BBC News Africa 2012a).6 Further-
more, the recent Boko Haram insurgency in 
northern Nigeria, which hinged upon reli-
gion and economic deprivation, also poses 
security concerns in the sub-region. Since 
its emergence in 2002, the Boko Haram 
insurgency has taken many lives, displaced 
several thousand and destroyed state prop-
erty (Walker 2012). Travelling to the south 
of Nigeria, the prolonged Niger Delta con-
flict over oil has further compounded the 
insecurities in West Africa’s most populous 
nation. The Niger Delta conflict has led to 
several kidnapping of expatriates, casual-
ties and the increased use of sophisticated 
weaponry in the region by militant groups 
such as the Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND) thereby heighten-
ing insecurity within the country and across 
the sub-region (Ejibunu 2007). 
Causes of Conflicts in West Africa
The root of violent conflicts and civil strife in 
West Africa is linked to several complex fac-
tors. In his article, ‘Conflict and Peace in West 
Africa,’ Cybil Obi identifies that: 
The roots of conflict in West Africa 
are much deeper and complex, and 
are embedded in the interplay of his-
torical factors, socio-economic crisis, 
legacies of authoritarianism and the 
politics of exclusion, international 
forces, and local struggles (Obi 2012).
Admittedly, while the aforementioned con-
stitute the broader causal factors, embedded 
within and related to them are bad govern-
ance and corruption, human rights viola-
tions, poverty, ethnic marginalization and 
small arms and light weapons proliferation 
(among others), which continue to serve as 
triggers and drivers of violent conflicts in the 
sub-region. Even though there are several 
other specific causes of violent conflicts and 
civil strife in West Africa, the paper will focus 
on discussing the aforementioned. 
Bad governance and corruption
Post-colonial rule of West African countries 
has been fraught with several challenges. 
Elemental among them are the issues of bad 
governance and corruption. Following inde-
pendence, several regimes across the sub-
region have mismanaged state resources and 
weakened governance institutions which 
has resulted in economic stalemate, politi-
cal apprehensions and breakdown of social 
peace and stability. Today, these twin factors 
constitute a major cause of violent conflicts 
and civil strife in West Africa. Several schol-
arly works on conflicts in the sub-region have 
identified bad governance and corruption as 
the underpinning factors fuelling and renew-
ing violence in West Africa. Conflicts in Nige-
ria, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte 
d’Ivoire and other West African countries 
notably hinge upon bad governance and cor-
ruption. For instance, in the Sierra Leonean 
war, it was identified that bad governance, 
corruption and poverty were the root causes 
of the conflict (Fithen 1999). Additionally, 
research conducted in Liberia by Patrick 
Vinck, Phuong Pham and Tino Kreutzer in 
2011 indicated that majority of the popula-
tion (64 per cent) identified, among other 
factors, greed and corruption as the cause of 
the Liberian civil war (Vinck et al 2011). 
Corruption in West Africa’s most populous 
nation, Nigeria, has been highlighted as one 
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of the underlining factors in the Niger Delta 
conflict and the more recent, yet very pro-
nounced, Boko Haram insurgency (Ejibunu 
2007; Brock 2012). Ironically, the Niger Delta 
region though blessed with the largest oil 
resource in Nigeria is also the poorest region 
in the country. This is perhaps attributable 
to the high corruption at the national level 
which does not give opportunity for oil 
wealth to trickle down to the ordinary ‘Del-
tarians’ and the larger Nigerian population. 
In 2003 for example, the Nigerian Anti-Cor-
ruption Agency, the Economic and Financial 
Crime Commission (EFCC) reportedly esti-
mated that 70 per cent of the oil earnings, 
constituting over US$ 14 billion was stolen 
and wasted (Ejibunu 2007). Reportedly, the 
majority of the perpetrators of corruption 
in Nigeria include senators, ministers, com-
missioners and individuals with higher con-
nections in the political playground (Ejibunu 
2007).7 In affirming the linkage between cor-
ruption and violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, 
Hassan Tai Ejibunu (2007) indicates that ‘see-
ing money coming from the Federal Govern-
ment, on earnings on crude oil sales, with 
essentially none of it reaching the ordinary 
people, has created condition for insurrec-
tion’ (Ejibunu 2007). 
Likewise, in a small country like Guinea-
Bissau, bad governance and corruption are 
deeply entrenched in the social, political, 
judicial and economic system leading to bit-
ter pent-up feelings among the local popula-
tion which are sometimes expressed through 
violence (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010). In 
their 2010 joint report on the ‘Root Causes 
of Conflict in Guinea-Bissau: The Voices 
of the People,’ Voz di Paz and Interpeace, 
international non-governmental and peace-
building institutions, chronicled the voices 
of local citizens of Guinea-Bissau on issues of 
corruption and conflict. Some citizens were 
quoted saying:
The President steals. The Governor 
steals. The minister and even the Prime 
Minister steal. The administrator 
steals. Who will not steal? The country 
is being destroyed by the President. It 
was there that the destruction began. 
If the President takes twenty-four bil-
lon (CFA), what is left? (Voz di Paz and 
Interpeace 2010: 52).
Another expressed that:
The health centres do not have any-
thing; patients have no bed and no 
sheets. The leaders go to build build-
ings. It is not the people that are 
spoiling them. The people are united, 
but the State does not want our unity. 
They are pitting us against each other. 
We are told, `That person is not worth 
anything. That lineage is not worth 
anything.’ So we fight while they will 
sit and eat together, laugh and clap 
(Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010: 52).
Clearly if the above mentioned persists and 
remains unresolved it could increase the 
likelihood for more violent conflicts and civil 
strife rather than ending them and building 
sustainable peace in the sub-region.
Human rights violations
Incidences of human rights abuses and vio-
lations are numerous in West Africa and as 
such this forms the basis for the eruption and 
renewal of violent conflicts and civil strife 
in the sub-region. Across the sub-region, 
there are reported incidences of sexual and 
gender-based violence, reprisal killings, beat-
ings, impunity for state officials and institu-
tions, high social injustice, repressive and 
brutal leadership, and unequal distribution 
of state resources among others (HRW 2003). 
All these serve as both triggers and conse-
quences of war. For instance in Nigeria, vio-
lations of the human rights of local citizens 
underscore as one of the factors causing the 
militancy in the Niger Delta region (Ejibunu 
2007: 17). Many of the oil companies in the 
region are reported to be causing environ-
mental pollution and economic marginali-
zation while the state supinely looks on. A 
specific example is the 1992 killings of youth 
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from Bonny, a local community, during a 
peaceful demonstration against the ecologi-
cal pollution and marginalization caused 
by Shell Company (Brisibe 2001). Unfortu-
nately, the state security institutions support 
these oil companies to violate the rights of 
its own citizens as was the case in January 
1993 when 300,000 Ogoni protestors who 
were harassed, arrested and killed by Federal 
government troops when demonstrating 
peacefully against Shell oil for environmen-
tal pollution and economic marginalization 
(Ejibunu 2007: 17). 
In Guinea-Bissau as well, the impunity 
for human rights abuse by state officials in 
part led to the violent conflict that desta-
bilized the country in 1998 (Voz di Paz and 
Interpeace 2010). Local authorities are often 
accused of engaging in beatings and oppres-
sion of the local citizens creating a culture 
of ‘Matchundade’8 (aggressive behaviours) 
which bred major conflict with brutal con-
sequences (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010). 
Due to the continuous existence of these 
repressive acts against the citizens and 
among ethnic groups, even after the 1998 
civil war, Guinea-Bissau seems to be sitting 
on a boiling pot of tensions which, unre-
solved, could explode into another violent 
conflict as was mildly witnessed in the 2010 
mutiny and the recent April 2012 coup d’état 
(Zenoumenou and Okeke 2012).
Moreover, human rights violations in seem-
ingly stable West African countries such 
as The Gambia and Equatorial Guinea are 
increasingly creating precarious situations 
for instability. Although these countries have 
not experienced large-scale violent conflicts 
in recent times as their neighbours have, the 
brutal, undemocratic, unequal and authori-
tative rule by incumbent regimes is creating 
tensions which, unresolved, could bring the 
countries to a boiling point of violent war and 
civil strife. The 2011 Freedom House report 
on the ‘Worst of the Worst: The World’s 
Most Repressive Societies’ named Equato-
rial Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire as part of the 
20 most repressed societies in the world 
(Freedom House 2011).9 The Teodoro Obiang 
Nguema Mbasogo regime in Equatorial 
Guinea for example, is not only accused of 
pervasive corruption but also rife human 
rights abuses including detention of politi-
cal opponents, torture, extrajudicial killings, 
interference in the judicial system, disregard 
for rule of law, widespread violence against 
women and impunity of security forces 
(Freedom House 2011: 14; USDS 2011). 
Similarly, the government of Alhaji Yayha 
Jammeh of The Gambia is accused of similar 
human rights abuses and violations (USDS 
2011). As stated earlier, although these vio-
lations have not resulted in violent conflicts 
in these countries, their linkages to politi-
cal and internal tensions in both countries 
cannot be overlooked (McSherry 2006).10 
For instance, since 1994, Yayha Jammeh’s 
19-year regime has experienced over four 
attempted coups and several tensions (BBC 
News Africa 2012b). 
Poverty
Poverty also stands to be one of the major 
setbacks in West Africa and the continent of 
Africa. According to the 2012 UNDP Human 
Development report nearly half of sub-Saha-
ran Africans live in poverty (UNDP 2012). 
Consequently, the poverty that many across 
the continent endure can be seen to be one 
of the major contributing factors to the 
occurrence of violent conflicts in Africa. Like 
the rest of Africa, the West Africa sub-region 
is neither immune to the poverty canker nor 
ignorant of its impact on their fragile peace 
and stability. With over 60 per cent of its 
population living below the poverty line of 
US$1 a day, civil unrest and grievances, both 
recipes for conflicts, become widespread. 
These agitations sometimes take violent 
forms and are seen as channels for punish-
ing governments for their failure to allevi-
ate poverty (ECOWAS 2006). For instance, in 
research conducted by Vinck et al (2011), 30 
per cent of the Liberian population indicated 
that poverty was one of the root causes of 
the Liberian civil war. Similar assertions have 
also been made with regards to the conflicts 
in Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau (Voz di Paz and 
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Interpeace 2010; Ejibunu 2007). In Voz di 
Paz and Interpeace’s 2010 report, poverty 
was stated as one of the major cause of the 
Bissau-Guinean conflicts, citing food insecu-
rity, lack of infrastructure and access to basic 
social needs as some of the poverty indica-
tors in the country (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 
2010). Emphasizing the connection between 
poverty and conflict, the Bissau-Guineans 
have an adage which states ‘In homes where 
there is no bread everyone fights and no one 
is right’ (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010). 
Indeed hunger, starvation, lack of economic 
growth and development create a high likeli-
hood of violent conflicts and civil strife. 
Ethnic marginalization
Ethnicity by itself is not violent however the 
concept has been manipulated in ‘societies 
polarized into two imbalanced divides with 
one faction feeling marginalized’ (Annan 
and Danso 2013). Correspondingly, James 
Fearon and David Laitin (2003) also believe 
that ‘a greater degree of ethnic or religious 
diversity… by itself’ is not ‘a major and direct 
cause’ of violent civil conflict…’ (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003: 75–90). Nevertheless, to a larger 
extent, for a heterogeneous community like 
West Africa, ethnicity has become a dividing 
factor that continues to drive violent con-
flicts and civil strife within and among com-
munities and states, destabilizing the peace 
in the sub-region. Research conducted across 
the sub-region identifies ethnicity and ethnic 
fragmentation as one of the root causes of 
violent conflicts in West Africa. Particularly 
for Liberia, this was prominent as 49 per cent 
of the population reportedly identified eth-
nicity and ethnic divisions as the root cause 
of the Liberian civil wars (Vinck et al 2011). 
More specifically, in the 10-year repressive 
rule of Samuel Doe, the Krahn and Mandingo 
ethnic groups were more favoured than the 
others which resulted in various ethnic ten-
sions that saw the rebellious invasion of 
Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, lead-
ing to the violent civil war that overthrew 
Doe’s government in 1996 (Vinck et al 2011). 
Currently, Liberians are still afraid of a poten-
tial renewal of civil war along ethnic lines 
when the United Nations (UN) Peacekeep-
ing mission ends (Vinck et al 2011). Similar 
situations exist in other countries such as 
Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria 
(Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010; Ejibunu 
2007; Ogwang 2011). For a small country 
like Guinea-Bissau, ethnic divisions are so 
entrenched among the various communities 
and at the national level, resulting in con-
stant fighting and violence (Voz di Paz and 
Interpeace 2010). Likewise, in a country like 
Ghana which is noted for stability and peace, 
ethnic division in its northern region, among 
the Andanis and Abudus has led to violent 
inter-ethnic strife that threatens the peace in 
the entire country.11 
Small arms and light weapons 
proliferation
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) pro-
liferation is one of the major challenges in 
West Africa. The sub-region remains an area 
of considerable SALW proliferation because 
of their affordability, accessibility and avail-
ability; and porosity of the borders and legal 
frameworks legitimizing their use (Keili 
2008). As reported by Edeko Sunday (2011), 
West Africa hosts about 7 to 10 million of 
the world’s illegal SALW as well as 8 million 
out of the 100 million circulating in Africa 
(Edeko 2011: 55–80; Kwaja 2012). Addition-
ally, 77,000 of the small arms are allegedly 
within the control of West African insurgent 
groups (Ebo and Mazal 2003). The circula-
tion of illegal arms within and across states 
has increased the proclivity of conflicts 
within the sub-region. Small arms prolifera-
tion has contributed to the mobilization for 
coups d’état, undemocratic overthrow of 
governments, increasing casualties and vio-
lent inter-communal and intra-state conflicts 
in West Africa (Ero and Ndinga-Muvumba 
2004). Since the 1960s there have been over 
37 successful military coups in almost all the 
countries in West Africa often resulting in 
violent wars; killing millions and displacing 
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many (Keili 2008). Furthermore, small arms 
proliferation notably fuelled the conflicts in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo (Keili 
2008). For example, arms were supplied by 
governments to aid the civil wars in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire (Keili 2008). 
For instance, Charles Taylor’s National Patri-
otic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was accused of 
supplying and distributing Foday Sankoh’s 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) with arms 
to fuel the conflict in Sierra Leone.12 The con-
flict led to the death of over 50,000 people; 
30,000 amputations; and the sexual viola-
tion of over 257,000 women (Ploughshares 
2002). Additionally, the Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) rebel 
group received weapons from the Guinean 
governments which they used to kill civilians 
in Monrovia during the conflict in Liberia 
(Keili 2008).
Initiatives towards Conflict 
Prevention and Resolution in  
West Africa
The outbreak of violent conflicts and civil 
strife in West Africa has led to several actions 
and interventions played by different actors. 
These actors include civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs), ECOWAS, the African Union 
(AU) and the international community. 
At the sub-regional level, ECOWAS’ 
involvement and efforts in addressing criti-
cal security challenges have achieved some 
noticeable success. In Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire, the deploy-
ment of peacekeepers through ECOMOG and 
the key mediatory role played by the sub-
regional bloc helped salvage peace and sta-
bility, bringing an end to the violent conflicts 
(Olonisakin 2011). Additionally, the involve-
ment of ECOWAS can be witnessed through 
its lead on the process of drafting and signing 
numerous peace agreements that resulted in 
the attainment of peace in several countries 
in the sub-region (Aning et al 2010). These 
include but are not limited to the Linas-Mar-
coussis, Accra II & III, and Pretoria Agreements 
on Côte d’Ivoire; the Accra, Cotonou and 
Abuja Peace Agreements on Liberia; and 
the Lomé Peace Agreement on Sierra Leone 
(Aning et al 2010). In terms of mediation, 
ECOWAS was involved in recent conflicts 
in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Guinea-Bissau to 
ensure that stability is restored. For instance, 
during the 2012 coups d’état in Mali and 
Guinea-Bissau, the ECOWAS Heads of States 
and Governments appointed H.E. Blaise 
Compoare of Bukina Faso and H.E. Good-
luck Jonathan of Nigeria as mediators for 
the respective countries (ECOWAS 2012). The 
ECOWAS has furthermore been collaborating 
with civil society organizations to implement 
its Early Warning Mechanism (ECOWARN) 
which seeks to prevent and monitor conflicts 
in the sub-region. For instance, for the past 
eight years since the operationalisation of 
ECOWARN, ECOWAS has been working with 
the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 
(WANEP) to monitor elections in Ghana, 
Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Conakry and 
other countries on the continent (WANEP 
2011). In addition, the adoptions of the Pro-
tocol, Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-
keeping and Security in December 1999 and 
the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 
(ECPF) in 2008, among other protocols, have 
helped enhance and affirm ECOWAS’ role as 
a key player in conflict prevention and reso-
lution in West Africa (ECOWAS 2008; ECO-
WAS 1999). 
The efforts of civil society and women’s 
groups within the sub-region cannot be 
ignored. Throughout the various violent con-
flicts and civil strife that West Africa has expe-
rienced, these groups have played a pivotal 
role in building lasting peace within com-
munities and states. The initiatives of groups 
such as WANEP, West Africa Civil Society Insti-
tute (WACSI), Mano River Union Women’s 
Peace Network (MARWOPNET), and Women 
in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET), among 
others, have brokered peace and ended vio-
lent conflicts in West Africa. For example, 
to end the Liberian war WIPNET, through 
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its advocacy campaign, ‘We want peace, No 
More War’ forced Charles Taylor and the war-
lords of the LURD to attend the peace talks 
in 2003 resulting in the signing of the Agree-
ment on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostili-
ties on 17 June 2003 (Jones 2011: 165). In 
a similar action, an advocacy campaign by 
MARWOPNET in 2001 brought together the 
presidents of Liberia (Charles Taylor), Sierra 
Leone (Tejan Kabbah) and Guinea (Lansana 
Conte) for a peace talk (Jones 2011: 166). 
This action marked the first time the three 
leaders had come together to discuss inse-
curity and peacekeeping along their bor-
ders (Jones 2011: 166). Other regional civil 
society affiliated institutions, like the Kofi 
Annan International Peacekeeping Training 
Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana (since its incep-
tion in 2003), have trained various military, 
police and civilians in conflict prevention 
and peacekeeping. The KAIPTC has also cre-
ated avenues for dialogue among civil society 
groups and other regional bodies on peace-
keeping, peacebuilding, mediation and nego-
tiation, and post-conflict reconstruction.13
At the continental and international level, 
the AU, UN and other bilateral and multilat-
eral actors have taken several initiatives to 
support the consolidation of peace in West 
Africa. The African Union for example was 
instrumental in ending Côte d’Ivoire’s post-
electoral violence that occurred in 2010–
2011. The continental body, among other 
initiatives, formed a five-member mediation 
group including Kenyan Prime Minister Raila 
Odinga, Presidents Robert Mugabe (Zimba-
bwe), Jacob Zuma (South Africa), Goodluck 
Jonathan (Nigeria) and Mohamed Ould 
Abdel (Mauritania) to broker peace between 
the two disputing factions (GNA 2011). Also 
in response to the April 2012 coup d’état in 
Guinea-Bissau, the AU at its 318th Council 
meeting placed a ban on Guinea-Bissau from 
participating in any AU activities until consti-
tutional order and peace was restored.14 
Beyond the borders of Africa, the UN and 
the European Union (EU) have also been key 
contributors to the consolidation of sustaina-
ble peace in West Africa. The UN for example 
has been deploying peacekeepers into vio-
lent conflict territories in West Africa for dec-
ades.15 Currently, the global body has peace-
keeping missions in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) 
and Liberia (UNMIL); however its mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) ended in 2005 and 
was replaced with the UN Integrated Office 
for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL).16 Through these 
peacekeeping activities, the UN help protect 
civilians; disarm, demobilize and reintegrate 
ex-combatant; support post-conflict recon-
struction processes; and establish peace 
and stable environment in these conflict 
zones.17 More recently, the global govern-
ance body has also been supporting ECOWAS 
in addressing the crisis in Mali and Guinea-
Bissau. For instance, the Secretary-General’s 
Special Representative for West Africa, Said 
Djinnit, participated in the ECOWAS Media-
tion and Security Council meeting on Mali 
and Guinea-Bissau took place in Abidjan, la 
Côte d’Ivoire, on 19 May 2012.18 In addition, 
the establishment of the UN Office for West 
Africa (UNOWA) in January 2002 has assisted 
the region to address, inter alia, issues of 
human rights abuse, election violence, cross-
border insecurities, security sector reforms, 
drug trafficking and organized crimes as well 
as provide funding for the implementation 
of state and regional programmes.19 The EU 
on the other hand, have been, among other 
activities, funding and supporting election 
observation and monitoring programmes 
across the sub-region. Since 2000, it has 
deployed 78 Election Observation missions 
worldwide including missions to 10 West 
African countries - Sierra Leone, Nigeria, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Ghana, Togo, Guinea 
Conakry, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Senegal.20 
Through these missions, EU has been work-
ing with local communities and state insti-
tutions to monitor, prevent and resolve elec-
tion-related violence in the sub-region.21 
Challenges to Ending Violent 
Conflicts in West Africa
Despite efforts made to prevent and end vio-
lent conflicts in West Africa, the region con-
tinues to experience sporadic violence and 
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volatile security challenges. The major chal-
lenge to ending conflict in West Africa can 
be attributed to the poor understanding of 
the fundamental causes of the conflict. For 
example in the current Malian crisis, the mis-
placed understanding of the international 
community that the root cause of the con-
flict is the terrorist activities by Islamists in 
the region; thus, placing it in the context of 
‘fight against terror’ has in part hindered the 
process of finding lasting solution for the 
conflict (Taylor 2013). In that it has shifted 
the focus from the deep seated root causes 
of bad governance, corruption, discrimina-
tion, ethnic marginalization, and unstruc-
tured military governance) to terrorist 
activities which is mainly an offshoot of the 
conflict(Bourkhars 2013). Other challenges 
identified by scholars include weak institu-
tional structures; language barrier (Anglo-
Francophone-Lusophone); lack of skills and 
expertise in conflict mediation and dialogue; 
lack of resources; lack of political will; lack 
of coordination between and among ECO-
WAS agencies and its partners; and non-
inclusive peace-building processes. These 
factors make ending violent conflicts in the 
region increasingly delicate and challeng-
ing (Afolabi 2009). In affirming the above, 
Aning and Bah (2009) identified a disjoint 
with regards to collaboration and coordina-
tion between and among ECOWAS institu-
tions and its external partners (Aning and 
Bah 2009). This they emphasized is affecting 
the implementation of the ECPF which was 
designed to ‘strengthen human security and 
incorporate conflict prevention activities as 
well as aspects of peace-building’ (Aning and 
Bah 2009). This has in part is also affecting 
the work operation of the ECOWARN. For 
instance, recently, the regional early warning 
system was criticized for not detecting the 
signs that led to the April 2012 coup d’état 
in Guinea-Bissau as the early warning mecha-
nism continued to grapple with internal and 
external coordination challenges (IPI 2012). 
Lack of resources of states and the sub-
regional body also hinders the resolution of 
conflicts in the sub-region. Financial, human 
and material resources for conflict resolu-
tion have been some of the sub-region’s 
challenges. For instance, most national secu-
rity forces lack the requisite equipment and 
capacity needed to adequately disarm bel-
ligerent groups. For example, in the Malian 
conflict, lack of equipment and capacity of 
the national army has been noted as one 
of the challenges preventing successive 
governments from addressing the Tuareg 
rebellions since the 1960s (Chew 2012). In 
Liberia also, despite the acclaimed heroic 
intervention of ECOMOG in 1996, material 
challenges such as lack of equipment, arms, 
sea and airlift capacities, and machinery to 
some extent, affected the effective imple-
mentation of the ECOMOG mandate which 
in part contributed to the re-surfacing of the 
conflict in 1999 after peace was restored in 
1997 (Isma 2001).
Additionally, lack of political will of gov-
ernments of West African states to create 
transparent and accountable governance 
institutions, address human rights issues 
and implement signed peace agreements 
and resolutions is also a challenge hinder-
ing the resolution of violent conflicts in the 
sub-region.22 For example, in the 2010 post 
electoral violence in Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent 
Gbagbo’s defiance to the ECOWAS communi-
qué from the Abuja Summit on 24 December 
2010, calling for him to step down, hindered 
the early resolution of the conflict; further 
fuelling the crisis as his loyalists continued 
to fight.23 Furthermore, limited involvement 
of women, local communities, grassroots 
organizations and civil society in peace-build-
ing and peacemaking processes perhaps con-
tributes to the challenges impeding lasting 
resolution of conflicts in West Africa. Women 
play essential roles in peacemaking in their 
communities, homes and organizations 
however, when it comes to official negotia-
tions and mediations, women’s participation 
and representation remain nominal (Iwilade 
2011). In West Africa, the primary organs for 
conflict mediation in the ECOWAS Member 
States are the Council of the Wise (CoW) 
and the Special Representatives and Special 
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Envoys of the President (Afolabi 2009). 
With the latter represented by only one 
female President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, many 
women are automatically excluded from par-
ticipating in formal negotiations. The exclu-
sion of women in this process often results 
in unresolved tensions. Melanne Verveer, 
Head of the US State Department’s Office for 
Global Women’s Issues, noted at the 2010 
Conference on the Role of Women in Global 
Security that thirty-one of the world’s thirty-
nine conflicts relapsed back into violent wars 
after peace agreements because women 
were excluded from the peace process (USIP 
2011). Moreover, lack of adequate expertise 
and skills of mediators also accounts for this 
persisting challenge (Afolabi 2009). Further-
more, effective peacemaking requires ade-
quate mediation and facilitation skills which 
seem to be lacking among members of the 
CoW, and other mediators in the sub-region 
(Onwuka 2009). 
Conclusion
Ending violent conflicts and civil strife in the 
sub-region requires collaborative and col-
lective efforts in (a) identifying the causal 
indicators of conflicts; (b) developing con-
crete strategies and programmes to prevent, 
manage and completely resolve these con-
flicts; (c) documenting, managing and dis-
seminating information on lessons learnt 
and best practices of conflict prevention and 
resolution, and peacebuilding across the 
sub-region; and (d) harnessing indigenous 
conflict prevention mechanisms while lev-
eraging with contemporary mechanisms to 
adequately address present and emerging 
insecurities and violent conflicts. Although 
the sub-region is increasingly volatile to 
vicious conflicts, its rich indigenous cultural 
and social values such as respect, protection 
of human life, freedom, cooperation and tol-
erance;24 coupled with its diverse population 
and numerous civil society organizations are 
prospective strengths and, if well harnessed, 
could be a driving force for ending the pre-
ponderance of violent conflicts and civil 
strife in West Africa. 
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Notes
 1 See Obi 2012.
 2 After the deployment of ECOMOG to 
Liberia leading to the ceasefire which 
ended the first civil war (1989–1996), 
ethnic strife among groups loyal to 
Charles Taylor refueled violence resulting 
in the second civil war (1999–2003) until 
the signing of the Accra Comprehen-
sive Peace Agreement ended the second 
civil war in 2003. See Insight on Conflict 
2012. 
 3 See Insight on Conflict 2012.
 4 For instance, Henri Konan Bedie’s con-
cept of ‘Ivoirité’ marginalized the non-
Ivoirians and the predominant Muslim 
north.
 5 See France 24 2012. 
 6 See UN Togo 2012 and Gilmour 2012.
 7 For instance a former Governor of Nige-
ria’s oil elite Bayelsa State, DSP Alamei-
yesegha allegedly stashed millions of dol-
lars in foreign bank accounts to procure 
mansions in the United States and send 
his children to private schools in London 
(Ejibunu 2007).
 8 It is a Bissau-Guinean culture where a 
man is measured according to his ability 
to be rough, bold, violent and arrogant.
 9 The report looks at political rights and 
civil liberties in various countries assess-
ing indicators such as electoral process; 
political pluralism and participation; 
functioning of government; freedom of 
expression and belief; associational and 
organizational rights; rule of law; and 
personal autonomy and individual rights.
 10 Equatorial Guinea and the Gambia expe-
rienced attempted coups d’état in 2004 
and 2006 respectively. 
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 11 See Aapengnuo 2012. 
 12 See The Trial of Charles Taylor 2008. 
 13 For more information see www.kaiptc.org. 
 14 See Ping 2012.
 15 For example, UNAMSIL, see http://www.
un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
past/unamsil/.
 16 Ibid.
 17 For more information see http://www.
un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.
shtml.
 18 See UN Togo 2012. 
 19 For more information see http://unowa.
unmissions.org/. 
 20 For more information see http://eeas.
europa.eu/eueom/missions/index_
en.htm. 
 21 Ibid.
 22 See Obi 2012. 
 23 For more information see http://www.
irinnews.org/report/91566/cote-d-ivo-
ire-ecowas-searching-for-a-regional-solu-
tion-briefing.
 24 See Afisi 2009 who says in pre-colonial 
Africa, war was not celebrated but when 
it was bound to happen, there were tra-
ditional regulations that ensured that 
human lives were protected, fighting 
takes place outside of the communities, 
peace agreements were respected, the 
period and duration of war determined, 
type of weapons used, method of combat, 
and women and the aged were involved 
in peacemaking processes.
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